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Explaining why fertility declines as populations modernize is a profound
theoretical challenge. It remains unclear whether the fundamental drivers are
economic or cultural in nature. Cultural evolutionary theory suggests that
community-level characteristics, for example average education, can alter
how low-fertility preferences are transmitted and adopted. These assumptions
have not been empirically tested. Here, we show that community-level
education accelerates fertility decline in a way that is neither predicted by
individual characteristics, nor by the level of economic modernization in a
population. In 22 high-fertility communities in Poland, fertility converged on
a smaller family size as average education in the community increased—
indeed community-level education had a larger impact on fertility decline
than did individual education. This convergence was not driven by educational
levels being more homogeneous, but by less educated women having fewer
children than expected, and more highly educated social networks, when
living among more highly educated neighbours. The average level of education
in a community may influence the social partners women interact with, both
within and beyond their immediate social environments, altering the repro-
ductive norms they are exposed to. Given a critical mass of highly educated
women, less educated neighbours may adopt their reproductive behaviour,
accelerating the pace of demographic transition. Individual characteristics
alone cannot capture these dynamics and studies relying solely on them may
systematically underestimate the importance of cultural transmission in driving
fertility declines. Our results are inconsistent with a purely individualistic,
rational-actor model of fertility decline and suggest that optimization of
reproduction is partly driven by cultural dynamics beyond the individual.1. Introduction
Most of the world’s population now lives in countries where fertility rates are plum-
meting, with a global demographic transition to low fertility projected by the end of
this century [1]. Yet explaining why and how fertility declines is a profound theor-
etical challenge [2,3], because it remains unclear whether the fundamental causes
are economic or cultural in nature [2–9]. Do individuals optimize their reproduc-
tive output based mainly on their own characteristics, or are their decisions
driven by the frequency of a particular behaviour in their local community?
Researchers agree that multi-causal, multi-level processes drive the onset and
pace of demographic transitions [4–9]. Nonetheless, most research is focused on
either micro or macro levels of analysis, with little integration between the individ-
ual predictors of fertility, for example education [10], and the wider socio-cultural
influences on reproductive decision-making. Studies comparing individual
characteristics across a population often favour economic models of fertility
decline; these emphasize the optimization of reproductive output based on the
costs and benefits of investing in the ‘quality’ over the quantity of children
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2[11–16]. However, studies comparing neighbouring popula-
tions have long suggested that people take their reproductive
cues from the behaviour of others, and that social transmission
and the diffusion of new cultural norms about fertility may be
more important [17,18].
Women’s education is the key predictor of fertility decline
[10]. And yet, at both an individual and an aggregate level, it
is unclear whether education is an economic or a cultural
variable [10,11]. Demographers have shown that province-,
district- or sampling-area-level education is correlated with
faster parity-transition rates [19–22], higher rates of contracep-
tive uptake [19,23–26] and lower fertility desires [19–24],
independent of individual education. Neither micro- nor
macro-level analyses explicitly incorporate the most important,
intermediate-level social structures that define peoples’ social
interactions: their local communities and ego-networks. It
remains unknown whether aggregated educational effects on
individual fertility are due to social transmission of new cul-
tural norms, or to ecological or economic differences between
study areas that might incentivize fertility decline. Strong
tests of cultural transmission hypotheses require community-
level analysis, which most available sources of demographic
data do not provide. Social network research can partly
bridge this gap, but research thus far has tended to focus on
contraceptive diffusion and not on fertility outcomes [27–30],
and little is known about how networks themselves may
change in the course of demographic transition. Measuring
individual access to contraceptives or healthcare, exposure to
migrants or mass media, or macro-level fertility rates may cap-
ture the general diffusion of information in a population over
time [11], but these do not necessarily capture the interpersonal
cultural transmission of fertility norms and behaviour in local
contexts. Cultural dynamics operate, by definition, at levels
beyond the individual and should therefore be examined at
the local community level. We know little about how the
characteristics of other people in local villages and networks
influence women’s fertility outcomes, and the causal mechan-
isms by which communities may affect individuals have not
been well tested.
Cultural evolutionary theory provides plausible mechanis-
tic links between individual decision-making and information
flow in populations [31,32]. This theory assumes that the fre-
quency with which individuals in a group embrace different
beliefs, or behave, is a good proxy for a cultural/social norm,
and further, that summary measures of these frequency dis-
tributions (such as the mean and variance) can be used to
compare cultural/behavioural norms between groups. Impor-
tantly, these frequencies can feed back to influence individual
decisions, such that a person with similar individual character-
istics may make radically different decisions in different
communities, depending on what others do.
Formal modelling shows that the average level of education
in a community can theoretically alter the cultural dynamics of
fertility decline, by modifying the social channels (modes) of
communication and changing the rates by which fertility pre-
ferences are socially transmitted [33–35]. For example, higher
rates of horizontal (peer-to-peer) and oblique (e.g. teacher-to-
pupil) transmission may speed up the diffusion of low fertility
norms even in populations that are homogeneously high in
fertility, less economically developed and/or subject to natural
selection pressure [33–35]. Increased frequencies of social
interaction with more highly educated people and with non-
kin, who are assumed to promote anti-natal values, arepredicted to have a fertility-reducing effect [32,36]. Higher
average education in a community increases the chances that
any person, irrespective of their own characteristics, is exposed
to low-fertility behaviour, to contraceptive users or to other
peoples’ preferences for educating children [31–36]. The level
of education in a community can therefore alter the speed of
fertility decline by subtly affecting who we interact with, and
thus the preferences we are likely to encounter.
These cultural dynamics also theoretically work at a
between-group level (i.e. between neighbouring populations
or communities of a larger metapopulation). High rates of
social transmission are predicted to homogenize behavioural
norms within particular groups [9,37,38], leading to between-
group variation in the speed of fertility decline. This can
expose individual communities themselves to low-fertility
norms while at lower levels of education than would be expected
if they were isolated [35]. Cultural evolutionary processes can
therefore potentially explain two important patterns that have
been observed by demographers. First, fertility declines often
differ among neighbouring populations at similar levels of econ-
omic development [4,17,18], especially when there are social
or cultural boundaries to social transmission, such as linguistic,
religious or ethnic affiliations. Second, and conversely, ferti-
lity declines can spread across economic boundaries when
neighbouring regions share a language or religion [17,18,39].
Examining which mechanisms drive these patterns requires
data at the appropriate level of aggregation and a representative
sample of communities.
In this study, we show that the average level of education in
a community substantially accelerates fertility decline indepen-
dent of individual- and other community-level characteristics,
most likely by altering the social interactions of less educated
women and thereby the types of fertility norms they encounter.
We examined multi-level effects of education on both fertility
decline and social network structure and composition, using
new data from a randomized study of 1995 women living in
22 randomly selected communities (21 villages and one
town) in a rural agricultural area of Poland. Our data provide
a rarely observed but valuable insight into a mid-transitional
population and our samples are representative of the villages
women inhabit (see electronic supplementary material).
Under-five mortality is low (see electronic supplementary
material, table S1) and completed fertility is high (grand
mean¼ 3.81 (+s.d. 2.15); figure 1), varying significantly
across communities from an average of 3.03 (+s.d. 1.85)
to 4.75 (+s.d. 2.56) children per woman at the end of her repro-
ductive career (ANOVA, p ¼ 0.024; see figure 1 for raw data).
Completed fertility is high relative to the Polish total fertility
rate (TFR) when the data were collected (1.38 in 2010; electronic
supplementary material) and to the TFR for the most relevant
birth cohort (2.16 in 1949). Given that Poland is a developed
European country, where fertility decline began around 1910
and which has had a below replacement TFR since the early
1990s [40], such high and varied fertility is remarkable.
Our study communities are characterized by centuries of
peasant subsistence farming, but are now rapidly transition-
ing to exclusive dependence on labour-market activities.
More than 65% (n ¼ 1255) of respondents continue to live
in subsistence farming households. The communities are geo-
graphically proximate (within an area of approx. 30 km2), at
effectively equivalent levels of economic modernization,
and are highly homogeneous with respect to religion and eth-
nicity. This enables us to isolate the effects of education from
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Figure 1. Raw data showing between-community variation in completed fertility+ s.e. (n ¼ 907 women aged 45þ). Grand mean completed fertility+ s.d. is
3.81+ 2.15 (solid line). Fertility is high relative to the cohort TFR for the most relevant (1949) birth cohort (2.16, dotted line), and to the national TFR when the
data were collected in 2010 (1.38, dashed line). Community ID numbers give the order of sampling, with communities shown in order of increasing population
density from left to right. There is no clear trend for decreased fertility in denser communities. The size of each point indicates the sample size of post-reproductive
women. Note that group 12 is the town.
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religious or ethnic differences between communities—this is
important because fertility declines tend to spread among co-
religionists and language speakers independent of economic
modernization [17,18,39]. In addition to individual variation,
our data capture community-level variation in population
size and density, proportion of inhabitants engaging in subsis-
tence farming, average household material wealth and market
integration (Material and methods; electronic supplementary
material, table S1).
We test a number of predictions designed to disentangle the
contribution of cultural transmission hypotheses from purely
individualistic optimizing models of fertility decline. If cultural
transmission models are correct, then: (i) higher average levels
of education in the community, rather than other community-
level measures of economic modernization, such as wealth,
market integration or population density, should accelerate fer-
tility decline over and above individual characteristics; and
(ii) less educated individuals should have lower fertility when
living among a higher frequency of highly educated women.
Women in highly educated communities should interact with
(iii) more highly educated network partners, (iv) more sources
of peer-to-peer (horizontal) rather than parent-to-child (vertical)
transmission or (v) more non-kin. On the other hand, if individ-
uals make reproductive decisions that are optimal relative to their
own characteristics, then: (vi) variation in fertilityshould decrease
along with variation in education; and (vii) community-level
education should matter more for highly than poorly educated
women, because factors like better educational opportunities,
higher employment rates and more intensive reproductive com-
petition may provide ‘runaway’ incentives and advantages to
investing in ‘quality’ over quantity [2,11–16].
We standardized our measures to enable comparison at
different levels of analysis. Our measures were also group-
mean centred so that an individual’s score represents her
deviation from her community mean (i.e. her education relative
to others in her local context rather than to others in the general
population—this differs from most previous work, which com-
pares randomly sampled individuals across a wider area).We then use group means to measure community effects—
this has the advantage of cleanly partitioning the variation in
the effects into within- and between-community components
(see electronic supplementary material).2. Results
Education was universally associated with reductions in ferti-
lity. Surprisingly, though, individual education was not a
significant predictor in all communities, and the effect was
larger at the community than at the individual level. A 1 s.d.
increase in individual education was associated with a
13% reduction in fertility (95% CI (20.19, 20.08), Wald z-test,
p , 0.001; electronic supplementary material, table S3), when
considering the average (‘fixed’) effect across all communities.
This association varied by community and was not always sig-
nificant, ranging from a 6 to a 20% decrease in fertility for every
1 s.d. increase in education (see electronic supplementary
material, table S4).
Independent of individual factors, a 1 s.d. increase in aver-
age education in the community was associated with an 18%
reduction in individual fertility (95% CI (20.26, 20.10), Wald
z-test, p , 0.001; electronic supplementary material, table S3;
figure 2a). A 1 s.d. increase in education at the community
level therefore had a 1.3 times larger effect than a comparable
increase at the individual level. Figure 2a shows that, indepen-
dent of their own characteristics relative to others, women in
the most educated community were predicted to have fewer
than half as many children (1.64+ s.e. 0.33) as those in the
least educated community (3.25+ s.e. 0.22). Note that these
results are independent of community-level controls for mod-
ernization and a range of individual-level controls (see the
electronic supplementary material).
Family sizes were more homogeneous in more highly edu-
cated communities. Figure 2b shows that the variance in
predicted fertility (here, given as s.d. to retain the same units)
declined as average education in the community increased,
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Figure 2. Community-level education is associated with a reduction in (a) mean (+s.e.) and (b) variance (given as s.d.) in fertility, independent of individual
differentials and of controls for between-community variation (n ¼ 1972). However, there is no clear relationship between (c) variance (given as s.d.) in fertility and
variance (given as s.d.) in education. In (a) and (b), each interval on the x-axis corresponds to 1 s.d. in average education. All panels show model-adjusted
relationships.
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Figure 3. Community education effects on less educated women only. (a) Fertility decline is more dramatic among less educated women when the proportion of
tertiary-educated women in the community is larger (n ¼ 1667), and (b) less educated women living in highly educated communities have more educated social
network partners (n ¼ 1667). Both panels show model-adjusted relationships.
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and these variances differ significantly across communities
(Brown–Forsythe test, p , 0.001).
An intuitive explanation of this pattern might be that
variance in fertility decreases along with variance in education.
However, figure 2c shows clearly that this pattern of convergence
has no relationship with how varied educational levels were in
the community: family sizes were more similar independent of
variation in individual education. This convergence is not pre-
dicted by purely economic approaches that rely on individual
characteristics as the primary drivers of fertility decline.
However, evolutionary-economic approaches do often
argue that there may be ‘runaway’ benefits to investing in
‘quality’ over quantity in more educated populations, or repro-
ductive competition to obtain the perceived fitness pay-offs
to producing fewer high-quality children [2,11–16]. We exam-
ined this possibility by modelling a cross-level interaction
between individual and average community education, but
this revealed no significant relationship, and the model fit
was not improved by including the interaction term (see elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S3). This suggests that
between-community differences in fertility are not driven by
the fertility-reducing behaviour of highly educated women.
In other words, highly educated women do not necessarily
reduce fertility more dramatically when the local context is
conducive to greater investments in offspring education.Instead, it appears that social transmission may drive the
differences between our study communities. Dividing each com-
munity into high and lower education brackets, with ‘high’
representing individuals with tertiary education and ‘lower’
representing everybody else, we re-examined the predicted fer-
tility scores of only the lower-educated women, against the
proportion of tertiary-educated women in the 22 communities.
This allows us to examine how lower-educated women, who
are not expected to reduce fertility substantially based on their
individual characteristics, may be altering their reproductive
strategies based on what other women around them do. As
figure 3a shows, less educated women had lower fertility in
communities with a higher proportion of tertiary-educated
women. This implies that simply living among a higher
frequency of tertiary-educated women may have influenced
less educated women to reduce their own fertility.
What are the potential mechanisms driving these effects?
Cultural evolutionary theory suggests that the level of education
in a community may independently drive changes in ego-
network size, density, proportion of alters who are kin,
proportion of alters who are horizontal sources of transmission
(neither parents nor individuals from the parental generation)
and average education of alters. We tested these hypotheses
using the same individual- and community-level controls, but
found no evidence that community education is associated
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5with social network changes in size, density, proportion of alters
who are kin or the proportion who are horizontal sources of
transmission (see electronic supplementary material, table S6).
However, network alters were significantly more educated
when ego lived in a highly educated community. Independent
of ego’s education, every 1 s.d. increase in community-level
education was associated with a 12% increase in average edu-
cation among the alters in the network (95% CI (0.04, 0.21),
t-test, p ¼ 0.006; electronic supplementary material, table S6).
Figure 3b shows that this effect holds true when focusing
again on less educated women only; alters in the network
were significantly more educated when ego lived in a commu-
nity with higher average education. This clearly indicates that
simply living in a highly educated community may influence
the characteristics of the friends that women choose to interact
with, and thus the kinds of social information they are likely to
receive. It is important to note that 48% of all network partners
were not resident in the same community as ego (see electronic
supplementary material, table S2). This result thus shows that
less educated women have strong ties with more highly edu-
cated women both within and beyond the boundaries of their
local communities.3. Discussion
Individual characteristics are only part of the story of demo-
graphic transition, and studies that exclusively rely on them
are likely to underestimate the importance of cultural trans-
mission in driving fertility decline. Cultural norms are by
definition factors beyond the individual; explicitly measuring
and analysing community-level characteristics is therefore
crucial for testing hypotheses about the local cultural transmis-
sion of fertility preferences. Community-level characteristics,
for example the frequency of highly educated women, do not
simply tell us about the distribution of resources and opportu-
nities in a population; they themselves may drive interesting
and important social dynamics, which cannot be captured
using individual characteristics alone. While demographers
have long been interested in measuring contextual effects
on reproductive behaviour, these have not often been
measured with appropriate community-level data and thus
could not determine whether community effects existed at
socially relevant levels of aggregation, or indeed if they were
independent of alternative predictors of local community mod-
ernization. Our study shows that they are, and furthermore
examines some of the causal pathways by which average
education might feed back to influence individual behaviour.
Among 22 groups of a culturally and ethnically homo-
geneous population at effectively equivalent levels of economic
modernization, the education level of other people in the com-
munity affected individuals’ reproductive outcomes. Indeed,
the community average had a larger effect than the individual
effect; a poorly educated woman was predicted to have twice
as many children when living in a less educated community
compared with living in a highly educated one.
Family sizes were also less varied in highly educated com-
munities, but this lack of variation in fertility was not due to
homogeneity in educational levels. Reproductive norms can
therefore converge on a small family size independent of indi-
vidual variation in education. Thus, although highly educated
women do tend to have lower fertility than less educated
women within communities, between-community differenceswere driven by the behaviour of less-educated women only.
It follows that comparing individual characteristics across
large swathes of a population will be insufficient for a full
understanding of the mechanisms of fertility decline.
Less educated women had strong ties with significantly
more educated women, both within and beyond their commu-
nities, when surrounded by more educated neighbours—this
result is all the more striking because the other social network
characteristics do not appear to change with community edu-
cation. Any person in a more educated group is exposed to a
greater variety of social learning models, as well as a greater
number of individuals exhibiting low-fertility behaviour.
Increasing average education may therefore alter both the con-
tent and structure of social interactions, consistent with cultural
evolutionary models assuming that it leads to higher rates of
social transmission, and thereby speeds up the diffusion of
low fertility norms [31–36]. Interestingly, the fact that net-
works contained highly educated alters living outside the
immediate community also points to a mechanism for spread-
ing low-fertility norms between communities: higher average
education within a community leads to interaction with more
educated women across communities—this is consistent with
formal modelling [35].
Our results strongly suggest that social transmission from
highly to poorly educated women accelerates the pace of ferti-
lity decline, once a critical mass of educated women is reached.
The principal mechanism driving this effect does not appear to
be a greater presence of non-kin [36] or of horizontal sources of
transmission [33–35] among the strong ties of ego-networks,
but rather an increased frequency of interaction with more
highly educated women. The individual adoption of low ferti-
lity norms and behaviour may therefore be prestige- or
conformist-biased [32,37,38,41], or indeed simply the result of
a more neutral process of randomly copying the most frequent
behaviour in the population [31,32]. Less educated women in
more educated communities are more likely to interact with
and observe the reproductive behaviour of highly educated
neighbours and friends, who may be more likely to endorse
behaviours consistent with lower fertility. This exposure may
change the expectations that less educated women have
about the most appropriate behaviour in their local commu-
nity, while also legitimizing and facilitating them to change
their reproductive preferences within their private social net-
works. This can then contribute to a faster fertility decline in
the community and lead to between-community variation in
the pace of demographic transition. It is important to note
both that the predicted differences in fertility between these
geographically proximate communities are large, and that
the ego-networks reported here are mainly distributed in
the local villages and towns (see electronic supplementary
material, table S2). District- or province-level analysis that
aggregates across these kinds of small-scale social structures
cannot adequately capture these dynamics.
We do not wish to imply that rational-actor decision-
making is unimportant in driving fertility decline, or that
cultural transmission mechanisms are the only important
causes of this phenomenon. On the contrary, our results
demonstrate the need to integrate theory and evidence on
cultural dynamics at the group level with individual
decision-making that optimizes the perceived costs and
benefits to reducing fertility. We simply emphasize that those
perceptions are partly driven by cultural dynamics beyond
the individual, with important implications for the speed of
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6fertility decline. The approach outlined here provides a
mechanistic link between the individualist, cost–benefit
decisions that people appear to make, and which a plethora
of micro-level data support, and the larger ideational shifts
that make smaller family sizes acceptable and desirable. Irre-
spective of whether explicit ‘norms’ are being transmitted or
whether individuals simply respond to the easily observable
correlation between fewer children and higher social status,
social transmission of fertility decline should homogenize be-
haviour within groups [9,37,38]; which is a prediction that
our data supports. Whether the initial fertility-reducers in a
population are responding to the real or perceived economic
costs of children is essentially a different question to whether
cultural transmission can spread low-fertility norms, and our
analysis focuses only on the latter question. All that is
needed for the process to take off is that a certain proportion
of individuals invest in education and that education is reliably
associated with lower fertility. Individuals do not need to
know what the mean level of education is in their community
for this characteristic to affect their probability of encountering
low-fertility norms and behaviour. Community-level charac-
teristics can alter the social cues to the most appropriate
behaviour in ways that are neither predicted by a person’s indi-
vidual characteristics nor by the level of economic or structural
modernization in a particular group. Community-level factors
may therefore have independent causal force [35].
These results raise important theoretical questions about
the extent to which individuals are influenced by their neigh-
bours in perhaps the most important decisions of their lives—
how many children to have—decisions that are expected to
be under selection pressure [42]. Our findings also have
important implications in mid-transitional populations.
Apart from the fact that improving average education in a
community will accelerate fertility decline, even among less
educated individuals [19–26], our results imply that the
mean may be more important than the mode. It is possible
that universally high education may not be as important as
ensuring that a critical mass of highly educated women is
reached, by which point the changing structure of social
transmission will facilitate the diffusion of low-fertility
norms to all individuals in the community. That feedback
between community- and individual-level education ratchets
up the speed of fertility decline may also have significant
implications for global fertility projections. More fine-grained
data and multi-level analysis are needed to explicitly test
hypotheses about the mechanisms driving these effects.
Although only one study to date has examined the influence
of education on fertility at multiple higher levels of aggrega-
tion [20], more local contexts mattered most and our study
supports this assertion. Thus, in the era of ‘big data’, there
remains an important place for smaller-scale anthropologicaldemographic research in elucidating the mechanisms that
underlie fertility change.4. Material and methods
Data were collected between 2009 and 2010 using a standardized
anonymous questionnaire and structured interview (see the elec-
tronic supplementary material for further discussion). We used
Poisson, linear and binomial multi-level regression [43] techniques,
which explicitly account for the non-independence of individuals
living in the same local context, to simultaneously model the effects
of individual- and community-level education on (i) fertility, and
on the following social network characteristics of (ii) size, (iii) den-
sity, (iv) proportion of kin, (v) proportion of horizontal sources of
transmission and (vi) average education of network partners,
excluding ego (see the electronic supplementary material, tables
S3–S6). At the individual level, all models included controls for
age, farmer status, household material wealth and household
market integration. In the fertility analysis, we additionally con-
trolled for age squared and experience of under-five mortality, as
well as including an additional random term at the individual
level to account for over-dispersion in the data. At the community
level, all models included controls for population density, propor-
tion of the population engaging in farming, average household
material wealth and average household market integration (see
the electronic supplementary material). These are important con-
trols for alternative measures of modernization at the relevant
local levels of analysis because all of these factors might jointly
drive higher education and lower fertility preferences.
We examined the following alternative model specifications to
check the robustness of our results in predicting fertility outcomes.
None of these altered our findings (see electronic supplementary
material, table S5): (i) excluding unmarried women (n ¼ 374)
from the analysis, (ii) including nonlinear parametrizations of
individual education on fertility within communities, (iii) using
uncentred variables, (iv) removing non-significant variables or
substituting average education for any other community-level
predictor; the model was a significantly worse fit whenever we
excluded average community education.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants and the study
protocols were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
of Anthropology at University College London.
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